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Abstract
We compare the inferences about consumer preferences that result from two diﬀerent measurement techniques, a simpliﬁed
hedonic rating system and a demand-revealing auction, for three separate groups of products. We ﬁnd that product rankings are
identical under the two measures if overall average ratings and bid prices are considered. At the level of the individual consumer,
there are some diﬀerences in rankings obtained under the two measurement techniques.
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1. Introduction
Hedonic rating techniques are widely and usefully
employed by researchers in marketing and consumer
science to elicit preference information about food pro-
ducts. Although there are several diﬀerent types of
hedonic rating systems in use (see for example, Schutz &
Cardello, 2001 for a comparison of several systems),
they have the common feature that consumers evaluate
the products on one or more rating scales. Economists
have employed a diﬀerent approach to eliciting con-
sumer preferences, the use of auctions [see for example,
Fox, Shogren, Hayes, & Kliebenstein (1998), Hayes,
Shogren, Shin, & Kliebenstein (1995), or Hoﬀman,
Menkhaus, Chakavarti, Field, & Whipple (1993)]. In
these studies participants bid cash to purchase products
and higher bids serve to indicate more preferred items.
Economists usually advocate auctions that are demand
revealing, that is, where the particular rules in eﬀect
imply that individual bidders maximize expected payoﬀs
in the auction if they accurately reveal preferences.
The coexistence of the two preference elicitation
techniques in the intellectual community suggests that
neither necessarily dominates the other. They may gen-
erate similar outcomes, or perhaps each might oﬀer
some advantages over the other. In this paper, we study
the extent to which the hedonic rating and the demand-
revealing auction systems generate similar results when
they are used to identify consumer preferences. We com-
pare the rankingsgeneratedintwo simple types of demand
revealing auction, the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mech-
anism (1964) and the Vickrey auction (1961) with those
resulting from a simple hedonic rating system.
Three general advantages of hedonic rating over auc-
tioning that do not come into play for the particular
goods we study here are the following. The ﬁrst advan-
tage is that the domain of hedonic rating is larger than
the domain of auctions. Hedonic rating can be used to
elicit preferences for goods that are not traded in mar-
kets. For example, it can be used to rate political can-
didates or government policies. The second advantage is
that hedonic rating is not susceptible to wealth eﬀects.
For example, eliciting preferences for new automobiles
by auction would lead to distortions in bidding behavior
because of the large monetary commitment. Hedonic rat-
ing avoids this problem. Thirdly, hedonic rating can also
be applied to compare products in diﬀerent quantities,
while bids inauctions are inﬂuenced by the quantity of the
product sold and further complicated by changes in mar-
ginal utility as the quantity purchased varies.
The hedonic rating system we study is a very simple
one-dimensional scale. A one-dimensional scale is cho-
sen to achieve the same dimensionality as the auctions,
which involve submitting a bid equal to a speciﬁc
monetary amount. The scale is left unlabeled to produce
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(B. Ruﬃeux).the same level of information as in the auctions, in
which the monetary amounts that one can bid carry no
qualitative label such as ‘‘high amount’’ or ‘‘low
amount’’. If the two techniques, auctions and hedonic
ratings, generate similar results, the choice of procedure
for a particular application can rest on criteria such as
the ease of training and implementation, the amount of
useful information revealed, and the level of precision of
the conclusions. If they do not generate the same results,
a strategy to choose the appropriate procedure is
required. Since underlying preferences are not directly
observable, and there is no obviously better alternative
experimental method to elicit them, we cannot use
empirical evidence to prove that one of the two systems
is more likely to generate data closer to the true pre-
ferences. However, we can study the data from the
mechanisms under comparison and verify whether they
have characteristics that are consistent with observed or
reasonable consumer behavior. Our data suggest some
potential pitfalls with the use of auctions, which are
discussed in the concluding section of this paper.
The experiments reported here have the following
structure. Subjects evaluate four products using a
hedonic rating system, and then participate in auctions
where they have the opportunity to purchase the items
for cash. Subjects are not informed of the utilitarian
characteristics of the products and the protocol is
designed to focus subjects on hedonic characteristics.
Hedonic characteristics are intrinsic properties of pro-
ducts that are related to the experience of their con-
sumption. For food products, these include taste,
texture, and color. Utilitarian characteristics are extrin-
sic and for food products these include shopping con-
venience, nutritional value, and price. See Chandon,
Wansink, and Laurent (2000) for a discussion of the
distinction between the two types of characteristics. The
products are distinct from each other in terms of taste,
but are close substitutes. Four products are sampled.
However, as described in Section 2, the ﬁrst product is
not used in the data analysis. There are three data sets
in our study, each using a diﬀerent group of products:
orange drinks, chocolate bars, and cookies. The com-
parison of hedonic rating and bidding behavior is con-
ducted within-subjects, allowing us to control for
heterogeneity in the individuals sampled, as well as to
study individual-level diﬀerences in responses to the two
elicitation techniques. The individual-level data are
analyzed in detail for one of the three data sets, the
orange drink data.
2. Methodology
The participants in our experiment were demo-
graphically representative of consumers in the Gre-
noble, France area. One-hundred and ninety-four
subjects took part in the experiment, each participating
in one of the 26 sessions. In 16 of the sessions, we gath-
ered hedonic rating and bid data for both the orange
juice and the chocolate bars. In the other 10 sessions, we
gathered the data for the cookies. The sessions were
conducted in two series, in June 1999 and July 2000, at
the Ecole Nationale Superieure de Genie Industriel
(ENSGI) at the Institut National Polytechnique Gre-
noble (INPG) in Grenoble, France. The ENSGI is a
school of industrial engineering forming part of the
INPG, a polytechnic institute. In each session there
were between 3 and 14 participants. The ages of the
subjects ranged from 18 to 79 years, averaged 33.7
years, and 47% were male. Thirty-nine percent were
college graduates.
Candidates were chosen by drawing names randomly
from the Grenoble telephone directory for recruitment
by telephone. At the time of recruiting, subjects were
asked whether they were consumers of orange juice or
of cookies, and if they made purchase decisions for their
household. If they responded aﬃrmatively to both
questions, they were invited to come to the laboratory
to sample food products for a publicly funded research
project conducted by university professors. They were
given no other details about what would take place
during the session. Eleven percent of telephone calls
yielded a participant. No subject participated in more
than one session.
The sequence of activity during a session was the fol-
lowing. There was a training phase, during which sub-
jects became familiar with the auction procedure, by
taking part in auctions to purchase ﬁctitious goods.
Subjects then tasted four products and evaluated them
using hedonic notation. Afterwards, they bid for the
four products, either orange drinks or cookies depend-
ing on the session, using the auction procedure in eﬀect
for the session. In the ‘‘orange drink’’ sessions, there
followed a second phase of hedonic notation and bid-
ding for chocolate bars.
2.1. The auction rules
During the sessions that focused on the orange drinks
and chocolate bars, we used second price sealed bid
auctions [also called ‘‘Vickrey auctions’’, see Vickrey
(1961) or Hoﬀman et al. (1993)] to elicit willingness-to-
pay information for the goods. In a second price sealed
bid auction, each subject simultaneously submits a bid
to purchase a good. The agent who submits the highest
bid wins the auction, but pays an amount equal to the
second highest bid among the bidders in the auction.
The other bidders do not receive items and pay zero. No
communication between subjects is allowed during the
bidding process. In the Vickrey auction, each bidder has
a dominant strategy to truthfully bid an amount equal
to his true willingness-to-pay. This means that it is
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an amount equal to his valuation for the product, no
matter what strategy the other bidders adopt, and no
matter what the risk aversion level of the bidder. This
strategic property is due to the fact that by bidding
lower than his valuation, the bidder lowers his prob-
ability of receiving the item, but does not lower the price
he pays if he receives the item, making him unambigu-
ously worse oﬀ, in terms of expected payoﬀ, than he is
by bidding his valuation. By bidding higher than his
valuation, he increases his probability of winning the
item, but the increase occurs only at prices that exceed
his valuation, also making him unambiguously worse
oﬀ.
In the sessions where the cookies were the products
being evaluated, the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak
(BDM) mechanism (Becker et al., 1964; Bohm, Linde ´ n,
& Sonnega ˚ rd, 1997) was used to elicit the willingness-to-
pay information. In theory, just as in a second price
sealed bid auction, the BDM mechanism has the ability
to reveal bidders’ valuations since in each auction there
is a dominant strategy to do so. That is, it is the best
strategy, no matter what the other players do and
regardless of the risk attitude of the bidder, to bid an
amount equal to one’s true willingness-to-pay.
There were between 5and 9 participants in the ses-
sions in which the Vickrey auction was used. This meant
that a bidder always had between 4 and 8 competing
bidders. The rules of the BDM mechanism are the fol-
lowing. Each subject simultaneously submits an oﬀer
price to the experimenter in a closed envelope. The
experimenter then randomly draws a sale price from a
range of prices spanning from zero to a price greater
than the anticipated maximum possible willingness to
pay among bidders. In our experiment, the range was
pre-speciﬁed to be between 0 and 1.5times the market
price of the product for sale. The range was unknown
to the subjects. Any subjects who submitted a bid
greater than the sale price drawn received an item and
paid an amount equal to the sale price. The strategic
situation is similar to a bidder in a Vickrey auction,
bidding against one other bidder who randomly bids
between zero and the maximum of the range. In the
sessions where the BDM was used, the timing of
activity was identical and the training procedure was
similar to those described in Section 2.2 for the second
price sealed bid auction.
2.2. The training phase
We include a training phase at the beginning of every
session for two main reasons: (a) to make sure that
subjects understand the rules of the auction, and (b)
once the rules are understood, to conduct a self-test to
verify that bidders behave as predicted. Previous studies
of the Vickrey auction and the BDM mechanism (Irwin,
McClelland, McKee, Schulze, & Norden, 1998; Kagel,
1995) have shown that untrained subjects must partici-
pate in several auctions before the dominant strategy
becomes transparent.
Upon arrival at the laboratory, each subject received
150 francs (roughly US$21) in cash. Subjects then par-
ticipated in several auctions in which they bid for ﬁcti-
tious items, whose only source of value was that winners
could redeem them from the experimenter for cash. The
ability to redeem the items from the experimenter
induced valuations for the items sold in the auction. The
technique of inducing value is widely employed in
experimental economics (see Smith, 1982 for a formal
presentation of induced value theory). An auction is
announced in which one or more units of a ﬁctitious
good are to be sold. Each subject receives information,
known only to him, that if he purchases a unit of the
good, he can cash it in with the experimenter for a spe-
ciﬁed amount of money. This redemption value
becomes the monetary value to the subject for obtaining
a unit of the good. Since the commodity is abstract, and
has no use other than conversion into cash, there are no
other sources of value for X.
During the training phase of our sessions, we con-
ducted between 3 and 6 auctions for ﬁctitious goods
sequentially. We refer to each auction as a period. In
sessions using the Vickrey auction, one unit of X was
sold each period. In sessions using the BDM procedure,
the number of units sold depended on the random sale
prices that were drawn. Valuations for X ranged from 0
to 389 francs, but were drawn from diﬀerent uniform
distributions in each period. Each subject received a
new valuation for X each period and valuations diﬀered
between subjects. After the subjects submitted their
bids, the experimenter wrote all of the valuations and
bids on the blackboard. He then asked the following
four questions to the group of subjects, who were free to
engage in open discussion on the topics (the experi-
menter did not participate in the discussion beyond
posing the initial question). (a) Which bid was yours?
(b) Which bidder won the auction? (c) How much did
the winner pay? (d) Do you regret the bid you sub-
mitted, now that you know how much the others bid?
After the discussion, the winner received an amount of
money equal to his induced valuation minus the price he
was required to pay. The cash was physically placed on
the desk in front of the subject after the auction. A ser-
ies of identical auctions was conducted using the same
procedure, but with new randomly chosen induced
values each time.
2.3. Presentation of products
After the training phase, the subjects were presented
with four products, without their packaging, labeling,
or any other information. The products were always
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example, MacFie, Bratchell, Greenhoﬀ, & Vallis, 1989)
has shown that presentation order inﬂuences the relative
rating of a series of products. Here, however, the
research questions concern comparisons between elici-
tation procedures rather than the products themselves.
We viewed keeping the order identical for all subjects as
best for our purpose because it maximized the number
of observations generated under identical conditions.
The data from the ﬁrst product in each group is not
reported here. It is well known that the ﬁrst product in a
series of taste tests tends to be rated more highly
because of its place in the presentation order, and we
sought to eliminate this eﬀect.
In the orange beverage sessions, subjects received four
clear glasses, each containing 0.08 l of a diﬀerent orange
beverage at a temperature of 12  C, and were asked to
taste the beverages. All subjects did taste all of the pro-
ducts. Before they tasted each product brought to them,
subjects were asked to drink spring water to rinse their
mouths before tasting the next beverage. They could
drink as much water as they wished.
The three drinks of interest were the following. The
second beverage presented was an orange juice from
concentrate. The next product was a 100% pure orange
juice, which contained pieces of orange pulp. Thus it
was fairly obvious that it was pure orange juice. The last
product was a ‘‘nectar’’, with both natural and artiﬁcial
ﬂavorings and considerable added sugar. The 100%
pure juice is the most expensive and the nectar is the
cheapest of the three juices on the market. All three
products studied were easily obtainable in supermarkets
and grocery stores, but the existence of many brands of
orange drink on the French market meant that most
subjects could probably not associate the drinks with
speciﬁc brand names merely by taste. The ﬁrst product
tasted, whose data was not used, was a diﬀerent variety
of pure orange juice.
In the chocolate bar and cookie studies, as in the
orange drink study, subjects were presented with the
four products one at a time, and were required to record
a hedonic rating after tasting each product. Each subject
received a quantity of one-third of a cookie or one-third
of a chocolate bar of each type. Every participant tasted
each product. The products were presented without
their packaging and labeling. The cookies were least
likely to be associated with their brand names because
of the highly segmented market with many close sub-
stitutes. However, one of the chocolate bars may have
been identiﬁable because of its size and shape. Between
tasting products, subjects were asked to drink a small
glass of spring water.
2.4. Evaluation of products
After tasting a sample of each product, subjects were
required to record an evaluation of the product on a
hedonic rating scale shown on a sheet of paper given to
them. They marked down how much they liked the
product on a scale where ‘‘I like it very much’’ and ‘‘I
don’t like it at all’’ were at the extremes of the range of
possible ratings [see Lange, Issanchou, & Combris
(2000) for another example of the use of this type of
hedonic rating]. The scale, translated into English, is
shown in Fig. 1. Participants indicated their evaluations
by drawing an X on the scale. The indicator was boun-
ded and the product could not be rated outside the
boundaries. The indicator did not display numbers to
correspond to diﬀerent ratings, though in our discussion
of the results we interpret the scale as ranging uniformly
from 0 to 20, with zero the lowest possible rating. The
experimenter collected the evaluation sheets before
introducing the next product. Thus, earlier evaluations
were not available when subjects rated the other pro-
ducts or when they submitted their bids in the auction
conducted later in the session. After subjects evaluated
all of the four products, they bid in four simultaneous
auctions for the products. In each of the four auctions
for orange juice, the highest bidder(s) received a liter of
the beverage sold in that auction. In the cookie and
Fig. 1. Example of the evaluation sheet used for hedonic rating.
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a bundle of 600 g of the product. The products
remained available for them to sample for the entire
experiment. In our experiment, every round counted so
that a subject could win multiple products. This rule
was chosen over the alternative of randomly drawing an
auction at the end of session that would be counted, and
thereby guaranteeing that no subject could win more
than one product (see Holt, 1986, or Starmer & Sugden,
1991 for a discussion of the random-selection tech-
nique). With our subject pool, we felt that the addition
of a random draw would add considerable undesired
complexity. Furthermore, with the particular products
chosen, marginal value declines slowly with additional
consumption so that the willingness-to-pay does not
change much as the quantity consumed increases. Each
unit is small so that it is unlikely that any consumer of
orange juice, cookies, or chocolate bars would be satiated
with one unit over the maximum life of the product.
3. Results
3.1. Group averages
Table 1 contains the average rating and bid for each
of the three groups of products. While the particular
hedonic rating system we use has no explicit cardinality
other than distance along the scale, we use cardinal
measures here because they include information about
the intensity of preferences. For the orange drink data,
the table reveals the same overall ordering of preference
for the three products, using both techniques. The
orange juice from concentrate is ranked the highest by
both measures, the pure juice is ranked second, and the
nectar is the lowest-ranked. Thus, the main conclusion
about which products are the most and least preferred
are identical under the two measures. This is rendered
more striking by the fact that the most preferred pro-
duct by both measures, the juice from concentrate, sells
for less than the 100% pure juice on the French market.
The other product used, a second brand of 100%
pure, organic orange juice, was given the third highest
average rating and commanded the third highest aver-
age bid. Thus the preference ordering of the four pro-
ducts elicited by the two measures was identical. The
organic juice has a higher commercial market price than
any of the other three products, so that both the results
of the auction and the hedonic rating fail to reﬂect the
prices on the commercial market. Unlike our experi-
ments, the prices on the commercial market reﬂect the
particular market segments and niches targeted by the
diﬀerent products, as well as diﬀering supply conditions
for each product.
The average rating and price observed in the auctions
for the four cookies show similar patterns. As with the
orange juice, both measures produce an identical rank-
ing. Product S is ranked the highest, followed by pro-
duct C, and then product N. For the chocolate bars, the
same product is ranked ﬁrst under the two measures,
and the two other products are very close together on
both measures, though their order is reversed. Using a
pooled variance t-test, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the average rating is equal for products 59d and 47f
(t=0.19). Similarly, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the average price is equal for the same two products
(t=1.055). We therefore conclude, using either measure,
that the two products are equally preferred. For any
other pair of products within any of the three data sets,
we can reject, using a pooled variance t-test, the hypoth-
Table 1
Average hedonic rating and bid for the three sets of products: all subjects
Juice from concentrate 100% Pure juice Nectar
Orange juice
Average hedonic rating (S.D. in parentheses) 9.32 (4.48) 7.54 (5.19) 5.35 (4.40)
Average bid (in French Francs) (S.D. in parentheses) 5.36 (3.72) 4.68 (3.64) 3.32 (3.12)
Average bid/rating ratio 0.57 0.62 0.62
Brand S Brand C Brand N
Cookies
Average rating (S.D. in parentheses) 10.88 (5.02) 7.91 (5.06) 9.91 (5.04)
Average bid (in FF) (S.D. in parentheses) 15.28 (12.96) 10.53 (10.68) 13.08 (11.00)
Average price/rating ratio 1.40 1.33 1.32
Brand 59d Brand 32s Brand 47f
Chocolate bars
Average rating (S.D. in parentheses) 8.20 (5.58) 11.74 (5.14) 8.06 (4.83)
Average bid (in FF) (S.D. in parentheses) 4.18 (4.24) 6.38 (5.76) 4.85 (4.60)
Average price/rating ratio 0.51 0.54 0.60
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level of signiﬁcance, with the exception of the average
diﬀerence in bid price between the 100% pure juice and
the juice from concentrate (t=1.253). We can also reject
all analogous hypotheses for average hedonic ratings at
the P<0.05level, with the exception of the diﬀerence in
ratings between cookies S and N (t=1.342). Overall, for
the aggregate data, the two elicitation techniques yield a
similar rank ordering of preferences.
However, Table 2 shows that there is less variance
proportionally across individuals in the hedonic ratings
than in the auction bids for the most preferred products,
but that the variance is similar under the two systems for
the least preferred product. The diﬀerences in variance
suggest that the two systems may exhibit some diﬀerent
patterns at the level of the individual decision maker.
3.2. Consistency between individual hedonic rating and
bidding behavior
We now consider whether individual participants
exhibit consistent behavior when both rating and bid-
ding on the products. We focus the individual level
analysis on the orange beverage data, and use four
standards to classify behavior as consistent. The ﬁrst is
Strict Consistency for All Products (SCAP). This
requires an individual to submit a strictly higher bid for
any product to which he assigned a strictly higher rat-
ing. It also requires any two products that were rated
equally to receive equal bids. In other words, an indivi-
dual’s behavior is strictly consistent for all products if:
Rating Product A ðÞ > Rating Product B ðÞ
) Bid Product A ðÞ
> Bid Product B ðÞ ;
and
Rating Product A ðÞ ¼ Rating Product B ðÞ
) Bid Product A ðÞ
¼ Bid Product B ðÞ ;
for all three products. A weaker standard is Weak
Consistency for All Products (WCAP). This standard
requires:
Rating Product A ðÞ 5Rating Product B ðÞ
) Bid Product A ðÞ 5Bid Product B ðÞ
for all three products. We also can apply both standards
to the question of whether individuals identify their
most preferred product in a consistent manner. We will
say that an individual exhibits Strict Consistency for the
Favorite Product (SCFP) if:
Rating Product A ðÞ > Rating Products B;C ðÞ
) Bid Product A ðÞ
> Bid Product B;C ðÞ ;
and Weak Consistency for the Favorite Product (WCFP)
if:
Rating Product A ðÞ 5Rating Products B;C ðÞ
) Bid Product A ðÞ 5Bid Product B;C ðÞ ;
The percentage of subjects satisfying all four criteria in
their revealed preferences for the orange beverages is
presented in Table 3. The table shows that there are
discrepancies between the bidding behavior and rating
decisions of individual participants. Only 28 of the 89
subjects (31.46%) had the same strict ordering of the
three products in both the auction and the hedonic rat-
ing measure. The consistency between the two measures
increases to 62.9% if weak inequalities are permitted. If
we consider only whether subjects indicated the same
preferred product with the two elicitation techniques,
64.0% and 74.2% displayed consistent behavior. Six-
teen of the 28 subjects who satisﬁed WCAP but not
SCAP bid zero for two of the three products.
Table 4 further illustrates the close relationship
between the two measures in revealing individuals’
favorite products, and the weaker correspondence for
the less-preferred products. In the rows labeled
Received highest hedonic rating and Received highest
auction bid, the table shows the number of subjects who
ranked each product the highest, by their hedonic rating
Table 2
Mean and standard deviation of hedonic rating and auction bid for
most and least preferred orange drinka







Standard deviation 3.11 2.67
(S.D.)/(Average) 0.91 1.00
a The average rating for the most preferred product is calculated by
(a) taking the rating of the highest rated product for each individual
and then (b) averaging the rating across individuals. The standard
deviation reported is of the above average. The average and standard
deviations of the least preferred product and for prices are calculated
in a similar manner.
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on two products identically, the observation was coun-
ted as 0.5for each product. For example, if a subject
ranked products A and B identically but higher than
product C, products A and B would both count 0.5
toward the highest ranked and 0.5toward the second
highest ranked. The following row, entitled Ranked
highest under both measures, indicates the number of
subjects who ranked the product ﬁrst on both measures.
The remaining rows of the table contain analogous
information for the second highest and third highest
ranked products. For each of the three products, there
is a diﬀerence of three (3.2% of the total) or fewer sub-
jects between the number that rated the product the
highest and who bid the most to purchase it. The aver-
age diﬀerences are 5.2 and 4.3 for the second and third
most preferred products, respectively.
Individual consistency is positively related to the
absolute diﬀerence in the individual’s highest and sec-
ond highest bids, a measure of intensity of the pref-
erence for his favorite product over his second favorite.
If the sample is divided in half by this diﬀerence, 70% of
the subjects in the upper half satisﬁed WCAP, while it
was satisﬁed by only 53% of the lower half. Of the
highest third of the sample, 77% satisﬁed WCAP.
3.3. Demographic factors
Since the two methods yield similar results at the
aggregate level, but not at the individual level, it is of
interest to consider whether the results are identical for
the market segments most commonly studied in isola-
tion, genders and age groups. Table 5 details the diﬀer-
ences between men and women. The table shows that
both measures yield the same order for either group. On
average, men give a higher rating to all three products
than women do, but rate them in the same order. The
average amount bid did not vary systematically between
the two genders, though men tended to bid higher than
women for the juice from concentrate and women bid
higher than men for the other two products.
Table 6 shows the average results for four diﬀerent
age groups. For all four groups, the rank ordering gen-
erated by the two techniques is identical. This is true
even though diﬀerent age groups have diﬀerent order-
ings. Overall, those under 40 and those over 55 tended
to display similar preferences, though subjects under age
29 were more favorably disposed toward the nectar than
those 30 and over. The age group 40–54 diﬀered from
the others in that members of the group tended to prefer
the 100% pure juice to the juice from concentrate. Thus
while there are no systematic diﬀerences in tastes
between men and women, there are diﬀerences based on
age. The two preference elicitation measures yield the
same conclusions as each other when applied to any of
the subgroups.
4. Discussion
The aggregate results are similar for the two systems
of preference elicitation for all three data sets. In parti-
cular, products that receive higher average ratings also
command higher average bids. The ratio of the average
bid to the average rating is remarkably constant within
each product category. If the diﬀerences in bids for the
two goods as well as the diﬀerences in distance on the
hedonic scales are interpreted as measures of the inten-
sity of preferences, both systems exhibit the same
measures of intensity of preference. Thus the two
instruments of measuring preferences, hedonic ratings
and auctions, behave in a remarkably similar manner at
the aggregate level. Although unlabeled, the hedonic
Table 3
Number and percentage of participants satisfying the four consistency




















Received highest hedonic rating 44 34.510.5
Received highest auction bid 41.537.5 8
Ranked highest under both measures 29 18 4
Received second highest hedonic rating 33.530.525 .5
Received second highest auction bid 31.525 33.5
Ranked second highest under both measures 20 14 11.5
Received third highest hedonic rating 11.524 5 3
Received third highest auction bid 16 26.547.5
Ranked third highest under both measures 6 14.538
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and more precisely a linear transformation of the auc-
tion bid. This occurs despite the minimal training sub-
jects received in the use of the hedonic rating system and
the considerable training in the use of the auctions.
Average rankings within demographic segments are also
identical, lending further support to the idea that the
measures generate similar outcomes for large samples.
However, a detailed analysis of the individual-level
data for the orange beverages reveals some diﬀerences
between the two techniques. Although an overwhelming
majority of the subjects bid the most for the product
that they ranked the highest, there were frequent incon-
sistencies in rating and bidding behavior for the second
and third most preferred products. Only about 60% of
our participants have a weakly consistent ordering of
the three products between the two measures. The other
40% have an inversion in their preference ordering. This
inconsistency appears to be at least partly due to a ten-
dency for agents to submit zero bids for less-preferred
items in the auction. Furthermore, Table 2 shows that
there is less variance proportionally across individuals
in the hedonic rating than in the auction bid for the
most preferred products. The table also indicates, how-
ever, that the variance is similar in the two systems for
the least preferred product. This appears to suggest that,
when giving a group of goods a hedonic rating, the
subjects tend to anchor on the most preferred product,
and give it a similar location on the scale. It also sug-
gests that the hedonic rating system can identify the
preferred product with less error than the auction can.
It may also be the case that a hedonic rating system with
more labels along the scale to guide choices might be
even more eﬀective.
Which is the better way to elicit preference informa-
tion, hedonic ratings or auctions? While an auction can
answer the question ‘‘How much is an individual willing
to pay for a product?’’ and the hedonic rating system
cannot, our data provide no evidence to indicate that
auctions are more eﬀective than hedonic ratings for the
elicitation of ordinal preference information. If the
question asked is ‘‘how does the average consumer rank
the products?’’ our results suggest that the answer using
either of the two elicitation techniques would be iden-
tical. Given the relative ease of conducting hedonic
ratings with large groups and the minimal training
required, there appears to be no reason to use an
auction to answer that speciﬁc question.
At the level of the individual, the two systems gen-
erate diﬀerent rankings. One possible explanation for
Table 5
Ratings and bids of the three products by gender
Juice from concentrate 100% Pure juice Nectar
Avg. Hedonic Rating: Women 8.25 (3.98) 7.37 (5.63) 5.25 (4.34)
Avg. Hedonic Rating: Men 10.39 (4.76) 7.62 (4.70) 5.39 (4.48)
Avg. Auction Bid: Women 5.10 (3.91) 4.91 (3.80) 3.51 (3.39)
Avg. Auction Bid: Men 5.52 (3.59) 4.31 (3.51) 3.04 (2.82)
Ratio of Avg. Bid to Avg. Rating: Women 0.62 0.67 0.67
Ratio of Avg. Bid to Avg. Rating: Men 0.53 0.57 0.56
Table 6
Ratings and bids of the three products by participants of diﬀerent age groups
Juice from concentrate Pure juice Nectar
Avg. Hedonic Rating: Ages 18–29 9.66 (4.45) 6.77 (5.30) 5.42 (4.66)
Avg. Auction Bid: Ages 18–29 5.29 (3.79) 4.11 (3.72) 3.32 (3.38)
Avg. Bid/Avg. Rating: Ages 18–29 0.55 0.61 0.61
Avg. Hedonic Rating: Ages 30–39 9.09 (5.66) 6.28 (4.37) 4.27 (3.37)
Avg. Auction Bid: Ages 30–39 6.13 (4.11) 4.44 (3.74) 2.76 (2.62)
Avg. Bid/Avg. Rating: Ages 30–39 0.67 0.71 0.65
Avg. Hedonic Rating: Ages 40–54 8.66 (3.94) 11.88 (4.42) 6.24 (4.47)
Avg. Auction Bid: Ages 40–54 4.51 (3.37) 6.50 (3.56) 3.66 (2.89)
Avg. Bid/Avg. Rating: Ages 40–54 0.52 0.55 0.59
Avg. Hedonic Rating: Ages 55 and Over 9.04 (3.84) 6.08 (3.37) 5.18 (2.82)
Avg. Auction Bid: Ages 55 and Over 5.94 (3.56) 4.93 (2.38) 3.67 (0.71)
Avg. Bid/Avg. Rating: Ages 55 and Over 0.66 0.81 0.71
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the individual level is that one or both of the processes is
characterized by non-systematic noise, which becomes
irrelevant if the sample size is large and aggregate aver-
age behavior is used to draw conclusions. This noise
may result from volatility of preferences or errors in
actions. Preferences may change rapidly so that the
same subject’s rating may be diﬀerent from his bid, even
though each might reﬂect his preference at the moment.
Alternatively, it may be the case that unintended
attractors inﬂuence and distort preferences and that
diﬀerent attractors characterize the two elicitation tech-
niques. In an auction, the price that one is willing to pay
may be inﬂuenced by his beliefs about the (posted) price
of the good on real markets. If there are alternate places
to purchase the good, his willingness to pay for a good
in an experiment may not equal his maximum will-
ingness to pay for the product, were it not available at
the market price. In a hedonic rating system, ‘‘expert’’
choices might also be powerful attractors. That is, a
subject’s ratings may reﬂect those he thinks the
researcher wants him to give, and he is in a sense
attempting to guess the ‘‘correct’’ answer.
However, we believe that there are two main reasons
for the diﬀerences in rankings. The ﬁrst reason is the
diﬀerent framing under the two systems has behavioral
consequences. The question ‘‘which product does an
individual like more?’’ is naturally suited to hedonic
rating, but is clearly distinct from the question ‘‘which
product is an individual willing to pay more for?’’ that
the auction implicitly addresses. Even in the absence of
the considerations listed in the last paragraph, choosing
the product one likes the most and choosing the product
one would like to own might lead to diﬀerent behavior.
Not only do we compare two diﬀerent preference elici-
tation techniques, we compare two diﬀerent hedonic
constructs, purchase intention, which the auction mea-
sures, vs. liking, which hedonic rating measures. As
Garber, Hyatt, and Starr (2003) argue, measures of
consumer preferences such as taste tests can often be
poor predictors of market success. Some inconsistency
of choices is not unanticipated given the incidence of the
‘‘preference reversal’’ phenomenon (Grether & Plott,
1979; Tversky, Slovic, & Kahneman, 1990), which is
that many experimental subjects give diﬀerent answers
to the questions ‘‘which alternative do you prefer?’’ and
‘‘which alternative you would pay more for?’’ In fact,
based on our data here, one might speculate that the use
of a hedonic rating scale yields preferences more in line
with ‘‘which alternative would you pay more for?’ than
simply posing the question of which product is pre-
ferred. Apart from the preference reversal anomaly,
however, internal or social pressure may cause a con-
sumer to remain in his own market segment against his
own tastes. For example, some older consumers who
rated nectar more highly than the pure juice also bid
more for the pure juice, and some of them may have
done so out of a feeling that the nectar was a product
for young people. This is not unlike the middle-aged
consumer who purchases a sedan or classical music,
even though he actually would prefer a sports car or
more modern music, which are sold at lower prices.
Another example is the consumer who likes the taste of
high-fat products, but would not purchase them due to
health concerns.
We believe that the second major source of diﬀerences
between the two mechanisms lies in two properties of
the auction procedure that can dilute its incentive
properties. Although the auction provides a measure of
the intensity of preferences, it is bounded below at zero,
and this can be a binding constraint. A considerable
proportion of the bids in our auctions were equal to
zero. There are at least three ways to interpret this pat-
tern. One is that some of the products were unac-
ceptable products that had zero value to the consumer,
even though they typically rated at least one higher than
the lowest possible rating of ‘‘I don’t like it at all’’. The
lowest possible rating may correspond to a price less
than zero. A second possibility is that the marginal
value for some subjects is zero or negative for obtaining
a second unit, given that the subject has purchased her
preferred product. This is unlikely because each unit is
small (1 l) so that it is unlikely that any consumer of
orange juice would be satiated with 1 l over the life of
the (unopened) product. It was announced at the
beginning of the experiment that subjects could have the
products they purchased delivered to their home imme-
diately following their experimental session. Thus there
was no cost of transporting the products from the site of
the experiment. A third interpretation is that a beha-
vioral bias exists in demand-revealing auctions for mul-
tiple goods. Bidders may tend to excessively concentrate
their bid on the item with the highest value to them at
the expense of the other items being sold. This is remi-
niscent of the phenomenon of ‘‘throwaway’’ bids that
appears in some auction experiments (see Cox, Smith, &
Walker, 1992, or Kagel & Roth, 1992), in which bidders
with a low probability of winning an auction often bid
zero.
This underscores two problems with the use of auc-
tions to elicit consumer preferences. The ﬁrst problem is
that if it is unknown whether a product is acceptable or
unacceptable, that is whether it has a positive or nega-
tive value to the potential consumer, hedonic rating has
a major advantage over auctioning. A traditional
implementation of an auction does not allow both
negative and positive prices at the same time. It is pos-
sible in principle to allow subjects to bid either positive
or negative prices for goods, though this is cognitively
demanding for demographically representative groups
of subjects. Fox et al. (1998) employ a clever technique
to solve this problem. They ﬁrst conduct a survey to
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The subject then receives a unit of their less preferred
product and then bids in an auction to exchange it for
the more preferred product. On the other hand, hedo-
nic rating when products can be either good or bad is
very natural. Thus hedonic rating systems are con-
ducive to the study of products, the sign of whose value
is unknown.
The other problem is that the incentive properties of
the auction and its ability to provide a clear ranking of
products are not as strong when the value of the good is
low. A bidder with a relatively low value is unlikely to
win an auction, and such bidders often tend to bid zero
even when their valuation is positive. The high incidence
of zero bids does not allow us to identify which of the
products that received a bid of zero is actually preferred
by the consumer. Participants tend to use a large fraction
of the range of possible hedonic ratings and diﬀerentiate
two products on the scale even when they would bid zero
on both in the auction. More generally, the hedonic rating
tends to diﬀerentiate products whose corresponding limit
prices are very close together. Thus hedonic rating is well
suited to the question ‘‘which of these low-value or simi-
larly-valued products does a consumer actually prefer?’’
Overall, even the simpliﬁed hedonic rating system we
have studied here is a reliable way to produce the same
ordinal ranking information that is contained in auction
bidding data, but in a way that may be simpler cogni-
tively for participants. Furthermore, hedonic rating
appears to oﬀer considerable advantages over auction-
ing if the value of the good is low or possibly negative.
We recognize that there are limitations to our study.
Our hedonic construct is very particular. It is one-
dimensional rather than multi-dimensional, and our
conclusions do not necessarily apply beyond our parti-
cular measure. The results may also possibly be sensitive
to our procedures. For example, all subjects sampled
and rated our products in a particular identical order,
the hedonic rating always preceded the auction bidding,
and the rating proceeded sequentially among the pro-
ducts while the auction bidding was simultaneous for all
products. We also included considerably more training
in use of the auction than in the use of the hedonic rat-
ing scale. Therefore, establishing the level of generality
of our results must await further research.
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